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HABITUAL ACCOUNTABILITY ROUTINES IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW 
BOARDS BALANCE CONTROL AND COLLABORATION 
 
Purpose 
Corporate accountability is a complex chain of reporting that reaches from external 
stakeholders into the organization’s management structure. The transition from 
external to internal accountability mechanisms primarily occurs at the board of 
directors. Yet outside of incentive mechanisms, we know surprisingly little about how 
internal actors (management) are held to account by the representatives of external 
shareholders (the board). This paper explores the process of accountability at this 
transition point by documenting the routines used by boards to hold the firm’s 
management to account. In so doing we develop our understanding of the important 
transition between internal and external firm accountability. 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
An inductive, case based approach identifies recurrent behaviour patterns in two 
matched boards over three video taped meetings. Sequential analysis of coded group 
and individual behaviours provides insight into boards’ accountability routines.  
 
Findings 
The boards engaged in clear, recurrent accountability routines. Individuals on the 
boards play different roles in these routines depending on the issue before the board, 
allowing both directors and managers to hold each other to account. The outsiders 
(directors) both challenge and support the insiders (managers) during board 
discussions, switching their behaviours with different agenda items but maintaining a 
consistent group level of support and scepticism across the meeting. This allows for 
the simultaneous development of trust and verification at the group level, a necessary 
condition for effective accountability.   
 
Research limitations/implications (if applicable) 
As board relationships and organisational context are highly variable, future research 
should concentrate on testing the generalizability of our results across different board 
and shareholder structures. 
 
Practical implications (if applicable)  
The results call into question the current governance focus on the independence of the 
individual director, as we identify that all directors appear to act as agents at one time 
or another in a meeting. Accountability at the boardroom level requires an effective 
group process not usually addressed in governance recommendations or regulation.  
 
Originality/value 
This study provides unique insights into board dynamics, documenting the 
accountability implications of group behaviours. By focusing on the group process, 
we highlight the potential mismatch of monotonic, individual-level approaches to 
governance and accountability prevalent in current agency approaches.  
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The Global Financial Crisis sparked an international effort to understand how 
accountability failures in the finance and banking system led to the largest economic 
disruption since the Great Depression. The UK’s Walker Review (2009) was one such 
effort that investigated the UK banking system’s contribution to the crisis. Its findings 
highlighted that nonexecutive directors’ (NEDs’) behaviours, rather than their 
independence, were systemically flawed. NEDs failed to hold executives to account, 
instead focusing on the routine aspects of governance. There was a “failure of 
individuals or of NEDs as a group to challenge the executive on substantive issues as 
distinct from [adopting] a conventional relatively box-ticking focus on process” 
(Walker, 2009: 53). 
 Walker’s findings point to the importance of understanding processes of 
accountability in corporations. Traditionally, corporate accountability focuses on the 
actors’ motivations – for instance, how external shareholders hold the insiders 
(management) to account (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). While 
standard theory suggests that NEDs need to be independent of the insiders they are 
charged with overseeing, Walker’s findings point to an additional requirement: the 
“outside” representatives need to be willing and able to challenge management.  
 This places NEDS in a difficult and unique position. They are inside the firm 
with access and ultimate formal control over internal information and decision-
making systems, yet charged with pursuing the interests of the external shareholders. 
Our aim is to examine director behaviours rather than their attributes (Dalton and 
Dalton, 2011; Gavetti et al., 2012) to understand better how directors balance their 
obligation of holding managers to account with the ever-present social pressures 
required to operate effectively with them (Roberts, 2001).  
Understanding the processes of boardroom accountability requires a broader 
approach to accountability research (e.g. Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Stein, 2008). 
The data reveal directors and senior managers engage in complex yet systematic and 
routine behaviours that initially appear paradoxical. While NEDs do hold 
management to account, they also hold their NED colleagues to account and are 
themselves accountable to the group for their decisions, views and actions. This 
seemingly contradictory transition in roles of accounting for and accounting to stands 
in contrast to traditional theory, which positions NEDs as guardians of external 
interests, singularly focused on holding management to account (e.g. Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  
These behavioural transitions are the mechanism by which functional 
accountability develops in the boardroom and are only possible because boardroom 
accountability is group-based. Ultimate corporate power rests with the board of 
directors as a group, not any individual director (Bainbridge, 2002). It is the group 
that holds managers and each individual to account (Fama and Jensen, 1983). By 
focusing on the group-level habitual routines (Gersick and Hackman, 1990) of 
accountability, we demonstrate that a stable, consistent framework at the group level 
provides a foundation within which individuals shift their role and behaviours in 
response to the issue facing the board. The routines allow participants to exhibit 
behaviours associated with both trust and distrust toward their colleagues over the 
meeting, leading to the development of group norms that support an atmosphere of 
trust and verification as management is simultaneously supported and subjected to 
intense review.  
The boardroom process we document builds on emergent perspectives on 
accountability such as socialized accountability (Roberts, 2001). While newer 
approaches such as this are positioned as complements or contingency conditions for 
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traditional theory, we suggest that the process of accountability reveals instead that 
different directors exhibit trust or distrust of management around different topics. We 
develop these conceptual arguments to provide unique insights into counterintuitive 
effects that may arise when boards blindly follow traditional governance 
prescriptions. We join calls for accountability research to move beyond a sole focus 
on holding managers to account, to one that involves a self-monitoring regime of 
socialized accountability inside the boardroom (Roberts, 2001) through routinized but 
dynamic role execution by meeting participants. 
Literature 
 Increasing boardroom accountability and transparency expectations are part of 
a broader systemic trend toward an “audit society” (Power, 1991). Less than forty 
years ago, boards of directors were seen as largely ineffectual and symbolic: 
“ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree” (Mace, 1971: 90) or “…parsley on the 
fish [of the corporation]” (Fleischer et al., 1988: 7).  Much has changed. Boards of 
directors are increasingly held responsible for corporate failure (e.g. ASIC v Healey 
[2011] FCA 717), leading some policy advocates to argue that expectations of a group 
of essentially part-time outsiders[1] are too high (e.g. see Cole 2012). 
Scant research addresses the tension between the level of accountability and 
transparency expected of directors and what they actually do for two important 
reasons. First, there are well documented barriers to studying accountability in the 
boardroom, most especially gaining access to boards of directors (Leblanc and 
Schwartz, 2007). Second, there is limited agreement on the precise nature of 
accountability and how it can be operationalized in the boardroom. Given our access 
overcame the first challenge, we commence by articulating an operationalized 
definition of accountability useful in a governance setting.  
 
Accountability in the boardroom 
While accountability is applied to a broad array of organizational contexts 
(Willmott, 1996), an agreed and precise definition continues to elude the field 
(Sinclair, 1995). Despite disagreeing on specifics, most researchers provide a 
definition containing two core elements. First, accountability involves the “giving and 
receiving [of] accounts” (Willmott, 1996: 24) or, perhaps more precisely, the “giving 
and demanding of reasons for conduct” (Roberts and Scapens, 1985: 447). Someone 
must be able (or obliged) to justify, explain or take responsibility for events or actions 
about which there are expectations (Cooper and Owen, 2007; Messner, 2009); 
accountability involves both a person questioned and a questioner (Stewart, 1984). 
Second, the questioned one’s explanation or justification goes beyond the “collection 
[and provision] of information” (Stewart, 1984: 28) and is subject to debate and 
challenge. In this way, the questioned becomes answerable for their explanation or 
justification and bears the consequences based upon an evaluation of the 
explanation/justification they provide (Jones, 1977). 
Both core elements of accountability are most often operationalized in 
business research as an agency relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). One party (the Principal) delegates authority to another to act on their behalf 
(the Agent). This creates the requisite relationship focus of accountability (i.e. 
between the questioning Principal and questioned Agent) as well as the requisite 
power dynamic, whereby one of the parties (the questioned Agent) is held to account 
or monitored and disciplined by the other (the questioning Principal). Thus, agency 
theory has developed as the predominant lens through which to view business in 
general and corporate governance in particular (Dalton et al., 2007).  
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Accountability in a corporate governance setting deviates from agency theory 
in important ways, however. There is rarely the simple dyadic relationship of a single 
Agent reporting to a single Principal (Chew and Greer, 1997; Gray and Jenkins, 
1985). Instead, the management (as individuals or a group) is subjected to review by 
the board—a group of directors, not an individual Principal as described by agency 
theory. Accountability in a governance setting, therefore, suffers the “problem of 
many eyes” (Bovens, 2007: 445; Collier, 2008) whereby the questioned 
(management) is often faced with multiple and sometimes conflicting expectations 
from multiple questioners (directors). 
  This fundamental difference between theory and practice is reconciled by 
simplifying assumptions. It is assumed that directors, particularly independent 
directors, will be motivated to pursue shareholders’ interests and act as though they 
are a single Principal. Similarly, it is assumed that management, motivated by self-
interest, will act as a single Agent and seek to exploit information asymmetries to 
further their own goals at the expense of shareholders. The limited empirical support 
for classic agency prescriptions (see meta-analyses such as Rhoades et al. (2000); 
Dalton et al., (1998)) suggests we need a deeper understanding of the accountability 
process to determine whether these assumptions are justified.  
 
The importance of process to boardroom accountability 
 Since governance and boardroom accountability involve questioning by 
multiple actors, accountability must be seen as a process (Huse, 2005). This shifts the 
investigation from Agency’s focus on individual actors (i.e. the questioner and 
questioned) to the relationships between the questioned and multiple questioners as 
they prepare for and manage the act of accountability. Given accountability processes 
are likely “more profound, ubiquitous and varied than is typically assumed within 
agency theory” (Roberts, 2001: 1549) a process approach offers the opportunity to 
identify mismatches between an Agency understanding of accountability and 
accountability-in-action. 
This shift in focus from actors to the multiple relationships that enable 
accountability requires careful construct operationalization. By employing Bovens’s 
(2007) definition of accountability, we move from a dyadic questioner-questioned 
relationship envisaged under agency theory, to one that focuses on the relationship 
between an individual and a forum. We adopt a defininition of accountability as (p. 
452): “(1) …a relationship between an actor and a forum; (2) in which the actor is 
obliged; (3) to explain and justify; (4) her/his conduct; (5) [and] the forum can pose 
questions; (6) pass judgment; and (7) the actor must face consequences”. 
Emphasizing the forum allows the research to include more than one questioner, a 
central feature of governance at the board of directors level. As well as invoking the 
“many eyes” of the boardroom, the operationalization includes the agreed, core 
elements of accountability definitions (i.e. questioning of a person and consequences 
based on the judgment of the explanation/justification). 
The forum of interest to our research is the board meeting, a unique and 
important setting in the chain of corporate accountability. It is the formal legal setting 
where the group bearing ultimate responsibility for the corporation (Bainbridge, 2002) 
is expected to hold the senior management to account[2]. As representatives of the 
shareholders (i.e. externals), directors are expected to ensure that managers (i.e. 
insiders) are acting appropriately and in line with their interests. Thus, the boardroom 
represents a key transition point or conduit between internal and external governance. 
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 Despite long-standing and continuing calls for deeper investigation of the 
inner boardroom life (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992), accessing the 
board meeting has long inhibited the research agenda (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). 
Instead of studying the phenomenon in action, governance research has largely relied 
on important assumptions. Most research treats power as a zero sum game where 
individuals pursue their personal goals over the resistance of others (Pfeffer, 1981; 
Weber, 1978). Given agency theory’s assumption of competing self-interest between 
Principal and Agent, the boardroom comes to be seen as the forum where those who 
have successfully reached the “top” of the organization seek to avoid accountability in 
their struggle for autonomy (Roberts, 2001).  
Research involving actual directors and managers provides a different 
perspective, however. These studies suggest more nuanced use of power in the 
boardroom — for instance Maitlis’s (2004) observation that four different processes 
underpin CEO influence on boards, or Parker’s (2007) insights into how institutional 
routines such as budgeting and strategic planning become the vehicle through which 
directors engage in the selective championing of strategies and ideas. Boards appear 
to be less “warring groups” battling for self-interested autonomy than social systems 
with “typical interactive routines” (Samra-Fredericks, 2000: 311) that guide the 
board’s work, as the directors simultaneously enact accountability and “do social life” 
(p. 313).  
While prior observational board studies have highlighted the importance of 
routines to understanding accountability in the boardroom, they still focus largely on 
understanding and describing behaviour based on the motivations of actors. Whether 
it is how the CEO sought to influence the board (Maitlis, 2004), or individual 
directors sought to champion their agenda (Parker, 2007) or to influence each other 
(Samra-Fredericks, 2000) the central process concern of these studies still assumes a 
zero sum view of accountability (Pfeffer, 1981). Their central question is how an 
actor imposes their will on the group. While research based on the motivations and 
actions of individuals are important for our understanding of lived governance, they 
run the risk of ignoring the importance of group effects and patterns of behaviour 
(Roberts, 2001) that can be quite distinct from individual motivation (Hackman, 
2002). 
 
Accountability in a group context  
Accounting back to a board of directors suggests the relevance of the general 
groups literature. While a detailed review is beyond the scope of this paper, groups 
research consistently highlights the danger in directly translating individual 
motivations, behaviours or attributes to the group level. For our purposes, three key 
issues arise.  
First, it is important to distinguish phenomena residing at the group level from 
those residing at the individual level. Most governance studies focus on individual 
level constructs, particularly in accountability research where the dominant agency 
logic invokes an individual level of analysis (c.f. socialized accountability research). 
In contrast, a construct such as cohesion (a well known example of a group attribute 
consistently linked to group performance) is an attribute of the group, not individuals 
within the group (Gully et al., 1995). Thus, it is important that our approach directly 
examine the patterns of both group and individual behaviour, looking for 
commonality and/or differences between them.   
Second, many studies have highlighted that seemingly logical extensions of 
individual level findings to the group often do not hold. For instance, while IQ is a 
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strong predictor of task performance across many different dimensions (Deary, 2000), 
aggregating the IQ of individuals to the group level (e.g. average group IQ) is not 
predictive of the group’s performance (Woolley et al., 2010). This presents both a 
conceptual and measurement problem that needs careful consideration; for instance, 
what is “group intelligence” and how would we recognize it (Carsen et al., 2013)?  
Third, even clearly defined and measured constructs exhibit complex 
relationships with group performance. Take the previous example of group cohesion 
where, on the one hand, meta-analyses suggest a generalized positive relationship 
with group performance (Gully et al., 1995). Other findings, however, provide 
evidence that strong cohesion is linked to group dysfunction such as groupthink 
(Janis, 1972) or the Abilene Paradox (Harvey, 1988), which is particularly 
problematic given the dysfunction is rarely evident to the individuals involved. Thus, 
even in the case of well known effects such as cohesion, the overall relationship is 
complex. Taken together, these insights highlight the importance of carefully 
differentiating group and individual levels of analysis in our study.  
 
Group routines and accountability  
Recent evidence suggests observing behaviours (such as group turn taking 
behaviour) may be critical to our understanding of group-based phenomena (e.g. 
Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer, 2015; Woolley et al., 2010). Routines of 
accountability represent one way of studying these group level behaviours 
independently of individual level motivations (Brennan and Kirwan, 2015). Routines 
have long been studied as a powerful force as individuals and groups find it difficult 
not to launch automatically into a routine once it is embedded (Gersick and Hackman, 
1990) creating a systemic, pervasive inertia (Pentland et al., 2012). In so doing, 
routinized behaviour overcomes logical processes and cognition (March and Simon, 
1958) and dominates rational thought. 
Given that effective governance (and its circumventions) requires logical 
thought and decision making, habitual routines in the boardroom are very likely a key 
component of effective accountability. Habitual routines entail “a group repeatedly 
exhibit[ing] a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given stimulus situation 
without explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behaving” (Gersick and 
Hackman, 1990: 69).  
Studying habitual routines offers potential insight into two aspects of 
boardroom accountability. First, any pattern discerned can aid our understanding of 
the regular use of power and influence in board decision-making. For instance, it 
seems reasonable to expect that a board dominated by management would exhibit 
different patterns of behaviour compared to a board that monitors management 
effectively. Second, and more importantly for our study, patterns of interaction may 
tell us more about the nature of accountability itself. For instance, a prototypical 
pattern expected under agency theory would seem to involve a stable routine where 
insiders (i.e. management) explain and justify to outsiders (NEDs) who question and 
judge the justification. In contrast, a different form of accountability, may suggest 
patterns of behaviour involving shared explanation and judgment with limited power 
differentials (e.g. socialized accountability (Roberts, 2001)). A key distinguishing 
feature of group habitual routines is their independence from routine behaviour of 
individuals or the content of the routine. It is the routine pattern that emerges 
irrespective of differences in actors and content that makes them so powerful. Thus, 
the existence of habitual routines in the boardroom can point to which notion of 
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accountability is being enacted in the boardroom. Our first research question aims to 
identify discernible patterns of interaction in board settings: 
 
RQ1: Do accountability behaviours in the boardroom conform to 
archetypal agency patterns or is some other pattern evident? 
 
Corporate governance research presents something of a paradox around the 
nature of boardroom accountability. While the predominant paradigm suggests boards 
are important devices for controlling management (Eisenhardt, 1989), there is also a 
distinguished tradition emphasizing that outside directors provide important advice 
and access to resources to the management team (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Selznick, 1949) with theoretical papers often suggesting a simultaneous process of 
control and collaboration in the boardroom (e.g. Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; 
Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). While there may indeed be differing mechanisms 
operating simultaneously, the process of managing these competing mechanisms 
remains unclear.  
The group-based nature of boardroom accountability (e.g. Forbes and Milliken, 
1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998) is one potentially important way of 
understanding how this paradox is managed. For instance, Roberts (2001) points to 
different types of accountability including, in the board context, a socialized 
accountability that involves group-based social processes of information exchange. 
Central to this approach is the development of both trust and distrust such that 
directors can question and support management at the same time (Roberts et al., 
2005). While this provides a different perspective on the nature of accountability, it is 
unclear how the individuals within the group simultaneously enact control and 
collaborate. Fama and Jensen’s (1983) early work suggests that understanding the 
individual’s role within the group process is key to understanding boardroom 
accountability. Thus, our second research question is: 
 
RQ2: What behaviours do directors exhibit to manage the control-
collaboration aspects of their role and is there any relationship with 
boardroom routines? 
 
METHODS 
 Given few direct studies of boardroom accountability, we employed an 
inductive research design (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). The cross-level nature 
of our research questions (i.e. routines of boards, and the actions of individuals within 
those routines) suggested a case study methodology. In addition to enabling both 
individual and group level analyses, the case method is a classic approach for 
capturing the interactions and dynamics central to our questions (Yin, 1994).  
 Direct observation of boards allowed us to “plunge ourselves deeply into the 
processes themselves…to extract theory from the ground up” (Langley, 1999: 691). 
This deep diving allowed us to inductively develop a coding regime based on 
Bovens’s (2007) definition of accountability. We used the scheme to quantify 
behaviours (Langley, 1999; Van de Ven, 1992) and employed lag-sequential analysis 
(Bakeman and Quera, 2011) to present evidence of the routine nature of boardroom 
accountability behaviours. Finally, we used visual mapping and representation 
(Meyer, 1984) to show the relationship between behaviours in temporal order (Van de 
Ven and Huber, 1990) and to represent the observed patterns of behaviour better.  
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Case Selection 
 The directors of Red, our first case, expressed an interest in having their 
interactions analysed. After several meetings, we gained sufficient trust to negotiate 
written consent from all directors to videotape three board meetings. Next, we 
recruited a second case (Green) to match Red as closely as possible. This sampling 
strategy minimized differences caused by environmental or company-specific 
attributes such as the organization type, industry, operating environment, and so on 
(Yin, 1994). Case replication meant routine identification was more likely, while 
simultaneously increasing the trustworthiness of claims that any behavioural 
differences between the two boards arose from differences in how accountability was 
practised rather than from external factors. Both boards were provided feedback on 
their behaviours after data collection was complete.  
 
The Cases: Red and Green. Red and Green are Australian, member-based 
corporations delivering services in the same industry and geographical region. Both 
share similar funding profiles (primarily government funded service contracts) and 
both were also incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001. This means their 
directors face the same legal requirements (e.g. fiduciary duties, reporting duties, 
solvency duties) as large, for-profit companies. These duties are generally shared 
across common law countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, the US and the UK.  
Red had an annual turnover of approximately $A5 million and was governed 
by a board of eight outside directors, five of whom were full-time industry 
professionals. The other three included a senior government employee, an elected 
member of a regional government and the CEO of an organization with strong links to 
a community segment important to Red’s work. The CEO of Red attended all board 
meetings as did a minute secretary. 
Green had an annual turnover of approximately $A4 million and was governed 
by a board of seven outside directors, four of whom were drawn from the same 
industry profession (i.e. the same background as five of the Red directors). Other 
directors included a partner at a professional services firm, a CEO of a government 
owned organization relevant to the industry, and a business owner drawn from the 
relevant industry. During the period of observation, the CEO of Green was working 
on a major strategic initiative while another executive managed day-to-day 
operations. Both the CEO and executive attended all board meetings along with a 
minute secretary. 
 
Data, Instruments and Protocols 
 Collecting qualitative and quantitative data from multiple sources allowed us 
to triangulate evidence (Yin, 1994). There were four key sources of data, each 
requiring its own protocols and instruments (see Appendix 1 for details). 
Observational data were collected via video recording of meetings, allowing any 
member of the team to “revisit” any aspect of the six board meetings. Access to 
transcripts and field notes from interviews allowed team members to understand 
individual participant perceptions; meeting mini-surveys provided insight into 
director perceptions on pre-defined aspects of meeting performance; while access to 
documents allowed us to understand better the context of the organization and how it 
was presented to external constituencies. Two independent coders were trained to 
provide greater trustworthiness and reliability in our findings (Eisenhardt, 1989b), an 
important consideration given our focus on routines. 
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ANALYSIS 
 We used an inductive approach to discern repeated patterns from the thick, 
rich data we collected. Following Suddaby’s (2006) advice, we commenced with a 
broad view of accountability based on Bovens’s (2007) definition, and gradually 
narrowed our focus through iteration between data and literature on accountability 
and routines. This occurred in five distinct stages where we gradually narrowed from 
a broad understanding of boardroom accountability to a coding regime to an emergent 
model that was triangulated with the literature and reviewed by practitioners for face 
validity.   
  
Stage 1: Organizing focus.  
Analysis commenced with a review of documents and interview data that were 
collected prior to observation. There were striking similarities in how Red and Green 
had routinized their board work: both prepared a structured agenda, both circulated 
pre-meeting reading materials developed by management, and both adopted a 
traditional leadership structure with a separate board Chair. Importantly, both boards 
approached their work on the basis of different topics (i.e. by agenda items), guiding 
us to structure our observational analysis at the item level. We also developed “mini-
surveys” to measure directors’ perceptions of each agenda item. Table 1 contains a 
summary of the key issues before the board. 
--------------------------------------  
Insert table 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Stage 2: Developing the coding scheme.  
Initial reviews of the video observations highlighted recurring patterns of 
behaviours such as items nearly always commencing with “scene setting”. After 
several rounds of iteration between the video data and literature we noted two 
qualitatively different groups of behaviour. The codes are outlined in detail in Table 2 
and comprise four accountability behaviours derived from Bovens (2007) and three 
different supportive behaviours associated with managing the group.  
--------------------------------------  
Insert table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
The code “Judgment and Consequence” (JC) was qualitatively different from 
others in our scheme as it provided a bridge between the accountability and group 
behaviours (e.g. see Hackman, 2002). Since formal board power rests with the board 
as a group not any individual leader (e.g. Baxt, 2014), boards need to resolve 
differences in individual judgments and preferred consequences. JC coded behaviours 
were instrumental to this process as they represent both an accountability and groups 
behaviour. Table 3 provides a sample of how this coding was applied to discussions in 
a boardroom item.To answer our second research question, we also coded whether an 
individual participant in the meeting was talking or silent, allowing us to distinguish 
group-level patterns from individual-level participation within those patterns.  
----------------------------------------  
Insert table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 
Stage 3: Coding and vignette development.  
Since our research questions focused on recurrent patterns, we followed a 
standard coding reliability protocol. We trained two research assistants by reviewing 
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segments of video, discussing the coding regimes, and applying those schemes to the 
data. Group level coding requires the coder to recognize a change in the overarching 
group behaviour (i.e. the narrative) and is more challenging than coding at the 
individual level where there are more clearly defined individual behaviour markers 
(such as a sentence or even individual contribution). Thus, coders would identify 
points in the discussion where the group focus changed and the segment of the 
meeting between each two changes in focus were coded as an event.  
Following training, both coders cross-coded ten of the 48 items to determine 
coding reliability (Bakeman and Quera, 2011). Time-based kappa[3] analysis 
demonstrated acceptable to good levels of reliability across all items. On the ten 
cross-coded items, time-based corrected kappas had a range of 0.69–1.00 (mean 0.89) 
representing an agreement range of 70–100% (mean 86%). In all, coding showed a 
2% difference between coders across items (i.e. one researcher coded 160 
management explanation/justification events compared to 157 from the second 
researcher, across the 10 cross-coded items). 
  
Stage 4: Model development.  
Coded data began to reveal clear patterns and sequences. For instance, we 
noted that management explanation (MEJ) was regularly interspersed with director 
explanation (DEJ) and both appeared to be stimulated by information requests (IR). 
Judgments and consequences (JC) occurred later in time during an item, but could be 
recursive. By iterating between the observations, other data (e.g. interviews and mini-
survey results) and the literature, we gradually developed the model of board 
behaviour illustrated in figure 1. Following initial model development, we exported 
the coding time log from Observer XT and analysed it using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2011) and GSEQ (Bakeman and Quera, 2011) to provide evidence of the 
reliability and trustworthiness of the model. Full code for data analysis along with the 
coded data set are available on request.  
 
Stage 5: Review and disconfirming evidence.  
Finally, we re-examined our findings, and the literature and sought review by 
practitioners for triangulation and confirmation. During this stage we reviewed 
interview summaries, presented tentative findings to groups of practitioners for 
external validation and reviewed key documents (e.g. minutes, agenda, etc.) to clarify 
and remove uncertainties, inconsistencies or conflicts. 
 
RESULTS  
 Findings are presented in two stages. First, the recurring complex behaviours 
recorded on video are presented in a series of quantified tables to communicate the 
comprehensive nature of our findings by demonstrating the scale and scope of 
accountability patterns. Our aim is not to claim external generalizability but rather to 
allow the reader to gauge the trustworthiness of the findings. These quantified 
summaries and relationships are then recast as a generalized illustrative diagram 
representing the routines of boardroom accountability. Vignettes and examples 
provide additional insights into the patterns and mechanisms outlined.     
 
The attributes of accountability behaviours in the boardroom 
 Table 4 provides a summary of the incidence (number) and duration of coded 
behaviours across both boards. Explanation/justification by management (MEJ) and 
directors (DEJ) dominate both incidence (59% of meeting events) and duration (73% 
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of the meeting time). The greatest discrepancy between incidence and duration 
involved inquiry behaviour (IR), accounting for 14% of meeting incidence but only 
5% of meeting time. 
----------------------------------------  
Insert table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Mean duration data also reveals that information requests (IR) generally take 
the shortest length of time per interaction and are qualitatively different from 
explanation and justification behaviours (MEJ and DEJ) as well as judgment and 
consequences (JC). However all accountability behaviours are quite short, indicating 
that board meeting accountability routines are highly dynamic. Appendix 2 contains 
more temporal descriptive data.  
 
The intertwined accountability of directors and managers 
 A traditional agency theory perspective of accountability (e.g. Eisenhardt, 
1989a) would suggest a pattern where managers provide their account of activities to 
the board (MEJ), are questioned (IR) and then respond (MEJ again). This is the 
general pattern of interplay emerging from the few studies of official meeting records 
(i.e. coding of minutes; see, for example, Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach, 2013; Tuggle 
et al., 2010). Direct observation of Red and Green did not reveal this pattern. Instead, 
results suggest a triadic interplay involving outside directors far more than a naive 
agency pattern suggests. Some 33% of the meeting duration involved events where 
directors were primarily explaining and justifying –  roughly the same level of 
explaining and justifying undertaken by management (40% of meeting duration). This 
overall pattern represents socialized accountability (Roberts, 2001) rather than a 
pattern expected by typical agency models.  
Instead, most meetings involved short periods of interplay between 
explanation/ justification from both managers and directors, with questions occurring 
half as often. Mean latency (ML) data (i.e. the time from the start of the agenda till 
the first onset of the code (Bakeman and Quera, 2011) reveals that while an agenda 
item started with meeting process (ML >1 sec) this was soon followed by directors 
(ML 89 sec) and managers (ML 147 sec) explaining and justifying behaviour. There 
was little to no evidence of long periods involving simple explanation or justification 
behaviours by management across the entire period of observation[4]. Further, the 
first explanation or justification more often came from a director, and even then there 
appeared to be a switch in group behaviour within less than 90 seconds. This provides 
further evidence of socialized accountability as core to boardroom accountability.  
The scale of interplay between director explanation/justification, management 
explanation/justification and information requests is provided in Table 5[5] and 
interpretation again corroborates the boardroom as an accountability forum for both 
managers and directors. The most likely two stage sequences in the data we coded 
were from MEJ to DEJ (4.17) and DEJ to MEJ (4.08); that is directors were over four 
times more likely to explain or justify their position following a management 
explanation (and vice versa) than would be expected by chance. Both MEJ (2.33) and 
DEJ (2.42) were more than twice as likely to follow a question/enquiry (IR) than 
chance, but this probability was just over half the interplay between 
explanations/justifications. What is perhaps most interesting is the rough equivalence 
of these odds: directors were as likely to be explaining/justifying in the forum as 
managers were.  
--------------------------------------- 
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Insert table 5 about here  
--------------------------------------- 
 
Structural positions in governance: the source of dynamic accountability 
Thus far, the data reveal the boardroom as a forum where a process of 
symbiotic accountability unfolds between directors and managers. On further review 
of the process, we noted a clear distinction in the generalized nature of the process 
depending on the level of analysis. At the group level, behaviours were highly 
predictable (see figure 1) with a clear and recurrent structure to discussions. By 
contrast, at the individual level, participants switched roles on an item-by-item basis 
(and even within items). For instance, each item we reviewed involved the board 
receiving information prior to the meeting (i.e. a board paper). During the meeting, 
the specific item would commence with a very brief facilitative comment 
(introduction) and then an explanation/justification that supplemented pre-circulated 
information (i.e. a board paper). Yet, often the person providing the explanation was 
an outsider (director) rather than an insider (manager). This is somewhat puzzling in 
light of a stylized view of agency theory, with its emphasis on the outsiders holding 
insiders to account.  
Closer review of the outsider-dominated items revealed a structural cause for 
this pattern: the actor was often delegated responsibility from the board and the 
“reversal” of explanation/justification was the delegate discharging their 
responsibilities. For instance, at Red one such item involved the Risk Committee 
providing a report to the board, while in Green an archetypal item involved an 
individual director delegated oversight of a specific task (as recommended by 
Sonnenfeld, 2002). In both items the remaining outsiders engaged in questioning and 
monitoring the activities of their delegate-colleague. The clearest example involved a 
contract issue facing Green. Management had been involved in problematic 
negotiations with a supplier that had been dragging on for several months prior to our 
filming. The board was clearly dissatisfied with progress and, during our filming, 
charged one of the appropriately skilled outside directors with intervening and 
resolving the dispute. From this point, the outside director took the lead in reporting 
on the item and was himself held to account at subsequent board meetings. Although 
we have selected a clearly unusual item to illustrate the relationship, we regularly 
noted outside directors being held to account both in terms of items and their position 
within items. Thus, both directors and managers appeared to have different roles in 
the organization’s control systems (e.g. the audit function, specific initiatives) leading 
to accountability for different things as the source of variability in individual 
behaviour.  
 
Group decision making - a core component of boardroom accountability 
Definitions of accountability consistently require that consequences or actions 
follow any explanation or justification. Without this phase, the process is an 
information transfer rather than a holding to account. At Red and Green the 
consequence phase would mark a critical pivot point in the group accountability 
process where one participant would present the group with their judgment on the 
item. This JC phase was discernible in 31 of the 48 observed items and always 
followed the explanation/justification/information request pattern outlined earlier (i.e. 
mean latency for JC (562 sec) was much later than DEJ, (89 sec), MEJ (147 sec) and 
IR (230 sec)). 
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 Since formal power in a corporation rests with the board, not an individual 
director (e.g. see Baxt, 2014; Bainbridge, 2002), this phase was critical to boardroom 
accountability as it marked the attempt to aggregate the individual views to reach a 
group outcome. This behaviour directly addresses the level of analysis concerns 
facing the governance literature (Dalton and Dalton, 2011) by highlighting how the 
individuals behave when moving to a group outcome. Individuals would either (i) 
support the position as presented; (ii) oppose the position; or (iii) provide an 
alternative to the position presented. The response of other group members then 
determined the accountability outcome.  
While the process is largely presented as linear (in both description and figure 
1), we note the item level process observed was often recursive. Recursion was due to 
meeting participants seeking a consensus (or at least majority) position on the 
judgment and consequence. Thus, in several items at both boards, a JC event would 
occur and, when all meeting participants did not share the proposed view, the group 
would revert back to another phase of MEJ/DEJ/IR interplay. Following further 
MEJ/DEJ/IR interplay, there was a final JC sequence where the group level position 
was agreed. Interestingly, even when the group level decision agreed with the pre-
circulated information or the key presenter’s position, meeting participants often 
supplemented the original proposal or altered the consequences. As the final JC phase 
drew to a close, more directors would begin to voice support for the proposed course 
of action (which might itself be merely to seek more information) and the interaction 
would move to a formal summary of the decision (coded as meeting process, MP) 
through to conclusion (coded as Close).  
The importance of these group-based phenomena again emphasizes the 
divergence between practice in the boardroom and the stylized agency relationship. 
What is particularly important to note is that while this JC pattern was recurrent, 
different individuals would stimulate this common pattern of group behaviour. There 
were no clear “opposers” or “supporters” on the board; rather these positions varied at 
the item level.   
Analysis also revealed group-based behaviours not normally associated with 
formal definitions of accountability supporting the view that boardroom 
accountability is a group based construct. First, there was a clear set of three 
behaviours designed to facilitate effective meetings, including: (1) an introduction to 
each item by the Chair (Item Open, ML < 1 sec); (2) facilitation behaviours during the 
meeting (Meeting Process, ML= 210 sec); and (3) closing off and summarizing 
behaviour at the end of the discussion (Item Close, ML = 1092 sec). Second, 
participants would use humour and affirmation during tense discussions to maintain 
group cohesion (Team Building, ML = 419 sec). While we found this interesting (and 
we conjecture it was tied to the group-level power of the board) it is not a specific 
focus of this paper. We do note, however, its apparent importance as a supportive 
mechanism to a functional accountability forum and process.  
 
Towards a process model of boardroom accountability 
Figure 1 summarizes our insights into the habitual routine of boardroom 
accountability. The area of each circle represents the proportional incidence of a code 
in the data; the larger the circle, the more prevalent the behaviour (see table 4). 
Arrows represent the odds that the behaviour at the head will follow the behaviour at 
the tail. The weight of the arrows is a proportional representation of the odds ratio of a 
relationship (taken from table 5) and we only include statistically significant 
relationships (p<.05) with odds greater than 1.25, a strong threshold given 48 items. 
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The position of the circle represents the average latency of the behaviour; that is, the 
average time the behaviour was first observed in an agenda item (see Appendix 2). 
Thus, the routine we summarize has a temporal dimension, with the sequence from 
left to right representing where each behaviour was likely to occur relative to others. 
Although the full pattern does not represent every agenda item we observed, it was 
the dominant pattern particularly for issues requiring decisions, thus satisfying the 
requirements of theoretical induction (Colquitt and Zapata-Phelan, 2007). 
----------------------------------------  
Insert figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
 The diagram highlights how both accountability and group process behaviours 
appear important to the habitual routine. It also provides a sense of the importance 
and interdependence of the MEJ-DEJ-IR triad to the routine, as well as the 
punctuation point provided by the JC behaviour, as the group attempts to resolve a 
path forward. This clear and recurrent routine was supported by other group-focused 
meeting process behaviours, item open and item close behaviours, as well as team 
building behaviours not traditionally associated with the concepts of accountability.  
 While the routine in figure 1 was clear and habitual, individual participation 
within the group routine was highly variable. For instance, participants would provide 
a majority of the justification/explanation (i.e. provide the account) in one item, and 
then switch to a more reactive, questioning role (i.e. holding others to account) in the 
next. Thus, the routine process of board accountability is more than managers 
reporting to directors (as a simple agency relationship suggests) but instead reflects a 
dynamic relationship with individual level behaviours varying by person by item. In 
some items a participant will be being held to account, while in others that participant 
will be holding others to account. This strong and changeable interplay between 
participants (both within and between items) suggests linear agent-principal 
accountability behaviours were rarely evident. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 As accountability continues to seep further into all aspects of our life (Power, 
1997), research is increasingly questioning the universal application of a standard 
agency perspective. This is particularly so in the context of organizational life where 
accountability involves reconciling multiple, complex processes. One emerging view 
gaining traction both academically (e.g. Roberts, 2001) and normatively (e.g. Walker, 
2009) holds that understanding the social processes of accountability is critical for 
furthering the field. In this paper, we have sought to advance our understanding of 
accountability in organizational life by documenting the habitual routines of a firm’s 
peak internal corporate accountability body, the board of directors. Direct observation 
of the board meeting forum (Bovens, 2007) reveals clear group-level routines that 
guide the giving and receiving of accounts. Within these stable routines, individual 
directors and managers engage in complex and dynamic roles.  
Our first insight is that the process of accountability is far more complex than 
a single power dynamic as suggested by the Principal–Agent relationship (e.g. 
Eisenhardt, 1989). Accountability definitions and research often invoke situations 
where one individual is held to account by another, or where one group (management) 
is being held to account by another (directors). While this may be theoretically 
accurate on specific issues, our data reveal that the process of who is being held to 
account and who is holding them to account varies by item. Should an outside director 
be delegated responsibility (for instance as Chair of a Committee or even with a 
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specific responsibility) they become accountable back to their colleagues on the 
board. These instances reverse the standard application of the agency relationship in 
the corporate governance setting, with the outside director being made accountable by 
the group, including the insiders.  
This flexibility emanates from the unique position of the board of directors. As 
a conduit between the internal and external accountability frameworks enveloping 
corporations, the board as a group is both a device to monitor management (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) and a group of individuals held to account by shareholders in the 
General Meeting (and other stakeholders via specific legislation). Since individual 
directors hold no power in the management of a company (unless specifically 
delegated by the board: see Baxt, 2014), the boardroom becomes an arena that allows 
for an ongoing shift in powers between the individual directors that comprise it (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). The core fiduciary duties of directors recognize this; conflict of 
interest occurs on an individual item level (Baxt, 2014). Since a director or manager 
may be self-interested for one item but not the next, director independence is, for 
many directors and managers, a transitory state. Donaldson and Davis’s (1991) call to 
differentiate situations where managers act as agents from when they act as stewards 
appears germane, and our data appear to point to this contingency resting at the item 
level, rather than as a characteristic of the individual per se.   
This variation in behaviour at the individual level raises the importance of 
group functioning as a key possible failure point, something not envisaged by simple 
monotonic agency-style accountability relationships. Without this pattern – aligned 
with the delegation structures in place – boardroom routines may devolve into a 
symbolic reporting ritual whereby the accounts provided are subject only to surface 
level review and probing. This appears to have been a factor in ASIC v Healey [2011] 
FCA 717, a high profile Australian legal case where the independent directors on the 
Audit Committee failed to oversee the preparation of the accounts properly. In line 
with the mechanism we have just detailed, the remaining directors (both insiders and 
outsiders) testified that they failed to review the work of the Audit Committee. That 
is, the outsiders failed to hold their colleagues to account and were found to have 
breached their duties of care and diligence. In contrast, a board with strong social 
norms that allow for the ongoing probing of each other’s opinions and decisions will 
not see questioning of each other’s behaviours and views as a negative, but rather an 
important failsafe in organizational accountability.  
Focusing on the item level and describing the change in roles at the individual 
level during a meeting highlights the problematic nature of important corporate 
governance prescriptions such as director independence. Emphasizing majority 
director independence would appear to rest on a monotonic relationship between a 
group of outside directors who hold the group of insiders to account. This appears to 
be a powerful logic that remains dominant despite strong quantitative evidence to the 
contrary (e.g. meta-analysis) and qualitative insights that point to the relative 
importance of a board’s social dynamic. Our contribution lies in demonstrating how 
boards generally delegate tasks to committees, thus creating new agency relationships 
with the individuals specifically recruited to monitor. In line with early theoretical 
work on agency theory (see Fama and Jensen, 1983) our data have suggested that the 
accountability forum is a dynamic space where the “monitors” and the “monitored” 
are constantly in flux. Rather than a monotonic independence, what is required is a 
blend of power relationships whereby no single individual holds the ability to remove 
any other. Developing this dynamic allows all individuals in the meeting both to bring 
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forward relevant information (particularly important for insiders, given the 
information asymmetry facing outsiders) and to question without fear of reprisal. 
 The shift in focus away from set power relationships between individuals to a 
norms-based, dynamic view of accountability provides a new avenue for 
understanding the control–collaboration paradox facing boards of directors 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Boards are theorized to play multiple often 
conflicting roles, for instance monitoring and providing access to resources (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). A key challenge for the literature has been to understand how and 
when boards reconcile the paradox of assisting while holding management to account. 
Our data demonstrate a possible avenue for further investigation: that these roles co-
exist in the group-based boardroom process. Since individual directors can monitor 
and provide resources, the group process allows for some outsiders to assist 
management (the interdependent explanation/justification behaviours of both insiders 
and outsiders in our data) while other outsiders were questioning or monitoring (the 
information request behaviours in our data). While not the focus of our current study, 
there are interesting implications for the possible co-dependence of roles. While 
others have developed theoretical insights into how this interrelationship may develop 
over time (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) further empirical work on the micro-
processes of the board may allow us to understand how item-level activity stimulates 
the arc of development of this relationship.  
 A second series of insights from the study focuses on the socialized nature of 
accountability in the boardroom. Accountability in corporate governance has tended 
to focus on the narrow, formal, and remote or externalized mechanisms of agency 
(e.g. Rose et al., 2013). Socialized accountability stands in contrast and has been 
developed to explain how more intimate and essentially trust (or distrust) based forms 
of accountability emerge in governance systems (Roberts, 2001; Roberts et al., 2005). 
The mechanism behind socialized accountability involves the frequent face-to-face 
contact of individuals in a low power differential environment such as that 
experienced in a board meeting. The open communication possible in this 
environment facilitates the sharing of information as individuals enact their 
interdependence. A possible downside is recognized, however, when market pressures 
or other outside forces begin to develop a strong in-group/out-group effect between 
the board and external parties. In cases where the group bonds too closely in response 
to an external threat, the group may rely on this internally developed sense of trust to 
thwart the external accountability pressures, thus undermining another important 
element of corporate accountability.  
 The routines presented here also allow for a third pathway in effective 
accountability. Rather than the development of trust or distrust per se (Sundaramurthy 
and Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999), the norms of the group can allow for an 
individualizing of accountability within the group-based socialization framework of 
board routines. Roberts’s (2001) typology of governance called for a form of 
complementary governance where the external forms of individualized accountability 
(such as market mechanisms) act as a safety net when socialized accountability within 
the boardroom fails. This views the key problem as balancing the external forces from 
markets, regulators and the like with the internal processes that promote trust and 
information sharing. Within this framework, socialized accountability is presented as 
a broad series of behaviours such as “challenging, questioning, probing, discussing, 
testing, informing, debating and exploring” (Roberts et al., 2005: S12). Through these 
behaviours a sense of trust and increased information sharing builds within the group.  
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 Our contribution lies in suggesting that these behaviours are most effective 
when engaged within a routine and expected discussion framework. Boards need to be 
able to manage the balance between supportive and critical director behaviour 
(Leblanc and Gillies, 2010; Roberts et al., 2005) and habitual routines allow these 
behaviours to occur in tacitly agreed, known phases. This aids boardroom 
accountability in two important ways. First, the habitual nature of the routine reduces 
the cognitive load on individuals: everyone knows how the discussion is going to 
proceed, where the key punctuation points are likely to fall and where conflict and 
challenge are likely to occur in the meeting. This reduction in cognitive load may also 
allow individuals to manage their levels of stress and perceived threat. 
 Second, the behavioural switching of individuals within routines provides the 
opportunity for the board to build a socialized sense of accountability based on an 
agreed norm that everyone will be held to account for the good of the decision. 
Typical approaches to accountability in a governance setting focus on how 
management is held to account by the board. The actions of individuals within the 
routines we have outlined demonstrate, however, that both insiders and outsiders are 
held to account by their colleagues. By interspersing the accountability of insiders and 
outsiders, the group is able to reduce the perceived threat of accountability that might 
lead to obfuscation, particularly by insiders, through the development of appropriate 
norms. No one group or individual need feel unduly threatened or singled out because 
it is the “way we do things around here” (Schein, 1992). This cultural overlay to the 
routine provides a way for the group to balance the individualizing of accountability 
that is necessary to ensure actions are justified with a socialization of accountability 
(or group-based agreement) on how that accountability occurs.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Given we only studied two boards and these were purposively sampled for 
similarity, there are a number of clear limitations to our findings. First, the patterns 
we describe and the behaviours that underpin them may be a function of the 
organizations we studied or the context in which they operated. Future work could 
look to expand the setting for observation by examining boards of different sized 
companies, companies operating in different industries, different countries and with 
differing board compositions. 
 A second key limitation is that we do not study the evolution of items (i.e. 
how the items developed across time). While several items we coded did not have a 
clear Justification/Consequence event, we suspect that this was a consequence of the 
emergent nature of the item before the board. Boards rarely deal with an item at a 
single meeting – instead the issue is introduced, elaborated, decided and reviewed 
over a series of board meetings. Future research might consider how this process of 
issue development occurs across board meetings and its impact on the accountability 
process.    
CONCLUSION 
As the Walker (2009) review and numerous researchers highlight (e.g. 
Roberts, 2001; Sonnenfeld, 2002), accountability requires more than form. What 
people do matters. Rather than viewing accountability as a monotonic and distant 
power relationship, this research has provided a lens for viewing boardroom 
accountability as reliant on routinized behaviours that allow management and board to 
develop the norms that support effective accountability. We hope to stimulate further 
research, discussion and practice that acknowledge the importance of group work to 
effective accountability in our society.   
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Table 1: Items analysed from full observation dataset 
 
Case Meeting Agenda item Item description 
Green 
1 
1.3 Conflict of interest disclosures 
1.5 Previous minutes 
2.1 Board meeting discussion 
2.2 Board subcommittees review 
2.3 [Redacted*] report 
2.4 Board retreat discussion 
2.5 CEO report 
2 
1.4 Previous minutes 
2.1.1 Strategic issues [redacted] 
2.2.1 Sub committee recommendations – governance 
2.2.2 Sub committee recommendations – finance 
2.2.3 [Redacted] update 
2.2.4 Strategic issues 
2.3 CEO report 
3 
2.1.1 Strategic issues – board committee representation 
2.2 [Redacted] update 
2.3.1.1 Governance – governance manual 
2.3.1.2 Governance – member approvals 
2.3.2.1 Finance – finance report  
2.3.2.2 [Redacted] update 
2.3.3 Strategic issues 
2.4.1 Staff employment contracts 
3.1 Chair report 
3.2 Meetings attended 
Red 
1 
6 Election of office bearers 
7 CEO report 
8 Environmental scan 
10 Previous minutes 
11.1 Risk management committee 
2 
6.1 CEO report 
6.1.2 Discussion re [redacted] 
6.1.3 Stakeholder communication plan 
7 Environmental scan 
8.1.1 Request for [redacted] 
8.1.3 Presentation by CEO of the draft strategic plan 
8.2 Routine decisions – CEO presented 2 reports  
10.1 Risk management committee 
10.2 Governance committee 
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10.3.1 Verbal report from [redacted] 
[Redacted] Unexpected discussion on [redacted] 
3 
6 CEO report 
6.1.1 Invitations to join [redacted] – strategic issue 
7.1.1 Implication of [redacted] – strategic issue 
7.1.2 Unexpected item on appointment of new Director
7.2 Environmental scan 
8.1 Presentation by CEO of draft purpose and values statement 
9.2 Previous minutes – matters arising 
10.1 Risk management committee 
 
*Some details have been redacted to maintain confidentiality 
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Table 2: Codings used in video analysis 
Theoretical 
Basis of Code 
Code Description Elaboration 
Accountability  
Management 
explanation and 
justification 
(MEJ)  
Interactions where 
management were informing 
the board on matters affecting 
the company
Bovens’s definition points #3 
and  #4 (management focus) 
Director 
explanation and 
justification 
(DEJ) 
Interactions where outside 
director(s) were informing 
the board on matters affecting 
the company.
Bovens's definition points #3 
and #4 (director focus) 
Information 
request (IR) 
Interactions involving 
queries, enquiries or 
questions about the 
substantive content of the 
item before the board 
Bovens's definition #5 
Hybrid  
Judgement and 
consequence 
(JC) 
Interactions involving the 
participants supporting, 
opposing or providing 
alternatives to the item under 
discussion. 
Bovens's definition #6 and #7
Group 
behaviour  
Team building 
(TB) 
Interactions primarily 
involving social interactions 
between participants. 
Drawing on group theory we 
noted that discussions often 
involved interactions 
primarily aimed at “getting 
along” – e.g. sharing a joke.
Item open (O) 
Interactions signifying the 
commencement of a new 
discussion. 
Group theory notes that 
group discussions often 
involve interactions to aid the 
process of group work. This 
involved beginning items 
with a process interaction to 
introduce the new topic.
Meeting process 
(MP) 
Interactions guiding or 
facilitating discussions. 
Behaviours aimed at 
facilitating the meeting and 
keeping it on track.
Item close (C) 
Interactions primarily 
summarising key points and 
decisions made at the end of 
an item 
Aid to group work by 
summarising the key decision 
and consequences of the 
decision.  
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Table 3: Sample application of coding to a board agenda item 
Code Summary of behaviours coded during item 
Meeting Open (O) The chair introduced the item and handed the discussion over to the acting CEO.
Management 
explanation and 
justification (MEJ) 
During the discussion the CEO and acting CEO explained the 
challenges around the current staff employment contracts and 
explained to the board their recommended course of action. 
Director explanation 
and justification (DEJ) 
During the discussion the Chair was heavily involved in further 
explaining the specifics of the challenges surrounding the staff 
employment contracts. The Chair also justified what had been 
done to date regarding this issue.
Information request 
(IR) 
Throughout this 27 minute item several of the other directors 
asked clarification questions (e.g. which groups of staff will be 
affected by the changes; what is the timing of the decision) and 
challenged the acting CEO, CEO and Chair on how they were 
planning to tackle the current situation.
Judgment and 
consequences (JC) 
At several times in the discussion directors (including the Chair) 
proposed how to deal with this issue. At first the board 
disagreed about these suggestions, resulting in more MEJ and 
DEJ. At the end of the item the board decided how to address 
the issue and advised the acting CEO of a date when they 
required a final verdict.
Meeting process (MP) 
In this item, one of the directors was not present but phoned in 
to the meeting and experienced difficulties in hearing the acting 
CEO. The Chair changed the position of the phone and from 
then on helped to better manage the involvement of this 
director.
Team building (TB) 
The discussion was quite intense and at several instances the 
Chair and another director made jokes that visibly eased the 
tension.
Meeting close (C) The Chair concluded the item by confirming the summary one of the directors provides.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for coded behaviours 
Codes: Incidence 
Relative 
incidence 
Incidence 
per minute 
Total 
duration 
(sec) 
Relative 
duration
Management explanation and 
justification (MEJ) 
664 0.29 6.93 23113 0.40
Director explanation and 
justification (DEJ) 
692 0.30 7.22 19072 0.33
Information request (IR) 324 0.14 3.38 3091 0.05
Judgment and consequences (JC) 146 0.06 1.52 4319 0.08
Team building (TB) 127 0.06 1.33 1897 0.03
Item open (O) 46 0.02 0.48 690 0.01
Meeting process (MP) 234 0.10 2.44 4885 0.08
Item close (C) 41 0.02 0.43 438 0.01
Totals 2274 1.00 23.73 57505 1.00
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Table 5:  Odds table for single lag sequential analysis for single page sequence of 
coded behaviours 
 
Leading      /       Following DEJ MEJ IR MP TB JC C 
Item Open (O) 1.57 0.82 0.13^ 2.15* 2.06 0.00^ 0.00^ 
Director explanation and justification 
(DEJ) 0.01 4.08* 1.32* 1.74* 1.35 1.56* 1.03 
Management explanation and 
justification (MEJ) 4.17* 0.01 1.87* 0.90 1.28 1.16 0.86 
Information request (IR) 2.33* 2.42* 0.00 0.09 0.14^ 0.33 0.00 
Meeting process (MP) 1.27 0.80 1.09 0.00 1.49 1.80* 2.89* 
Team building (TB) 0.88 1.14 0.39 2.82* 0.00 0.82 2.35 
Judgment and consequences (JC) 0.88 0.94 1.26 1.99* 1.09 0.00 0.72 
 
* significantly more likely, p<.05 
^ significantly less likely, p<.05 
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic representation of the boardroom accountability routine. 
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Appendix 1: Instruments and data sources 
Data Source Objectives Sampling Collection Process Research Team Involvement 
Interviews 
Understand context
of organization, 
perceptions of 
accountability 
activities and 
performance of 
board and 
organization
Total of 6 in 
person and 8 
phone 
interviews 
across both 
cases 
• Interviews lasted 
approximately 30 
to 60 minutes; 
• Field notes taken; 
• Semi-structured 
and evolving 
interview protocol 
• Two members 
interviewed each 
participant with a 
semi-structured 
interview protocol.  
Observations 
Identify 
accountability 
routines in board 
meetings and how 
individual directors 
contributed 
Total of 
three board 
meetings for 
each board 
•Each observation 
lasted between 90 
and 325 minutes; 
• Meetings were 
videotaped by 
three different 
cameras 
• Participants asked 
to fill out mini-
surveys during 
meetings 
• Participants asked 
to fill out end of 
meeting survey 
• Each board meeting 
tape was reviewed 
by at least two 
research team 
members; 
• Coding conducted 
by trained Research 
Assistants and 
investigators; 
• All interpretation 
conducted by 
Research Team and 
Research Assistants
Document 
review 
Understand context
of organization; 
Identify how board 
and organization 
were presented to 
constituencies; 
Triangulate 
emerging evidence 
from primary data
Reviewed 
agendas, 
annual 
reports, 
websites and 
minutes 
from 
meetings 
• Documents 
reviewed as input 
to development of 
case vignettes 
• Members of the
team reviewed 
documents prior to 
the interview and 
observation stages; 
• Documents referred 
to during the 
iterative process of 
analysis
Meeting mini 
surveys 
Understand 
perceptions of 
participants on 
aspects of the items 
before the board 
Total of 39 
meeting 
mini-surveys 
and 351 
agenda item 
mini-surveys 
collected 
over the 6 
meetings 
• Mini survey for 
each agenda item 
(see appendix A 
for details) 
• Mini survey for 
each board 
meeting (see 
appendix B for 
details) 
• One research team
member 
administered during 
observation; 
• Primary data entry 
conducted by one 
Assistant; data 
cleaning by 
different Assistant 
• Analysis completed 
by one member of 
the research team; 
• Interpretation by all 
research team
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Appendix 2: Temporal descriptive data for coded behaviours 
Codes: Mean duration 
Range of 
duration
Mean 
gap 
between 
codes 
Range of 
gap 
between 
code 
Mean 
latency 
Latency 
range 
Management explanation and
justification (MEJ) 35 1 - 494 37 0 - 526 147 0 - 563 
Director explanation and 
justification (DEJ) 28 1 - 330 49 0 - 678 89 4 - 673 
Information request (IR) 10 1 - 114 120 0 - 1260 230 0 - 1697 
Judgment and consequences (JC) 30 1 - 198 103 3 - 1437 562 64 - 3789 
Team building (TB) 15 1 - 122 255 1 - 1841 419 9 - 2153 
Item open (O) 15 2 - 47 113 113 - 126 >1 0 - 32 
Meeting process (MP) 21 1 - 179 189 3 - 2626 210 0 - 1404 
Item close (C) 11 1 - 75 25 7 - 43 1092 67 - 4809 
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Endnotes 
 
1 We use the term “external(s)” to denote shareholders (as external to the firm) and 
“outsiders” for non-executive directors. While NEDs are inside the corporate decision 
system, they act for the externals and are, by nature of their part-time status 
“outsiders” to management. We employ the term “outsiders“  as a description for non-
executive directors as is typical in the boards-of-directors literature.				
 
2 This is because individual directors do not have any power to sanction or reward 
management – decisions need to be made by the group as whole. This occurs during 
the board meeting.  
 
3 Reliability of time-based events is difficult to achieve because it requires coders to 
identify “events”, where an event represents a period of time to which a code is 
applied. Thus, coders need to identify not only the appropriate code to apply but also 
the onset timing of event changes (Bakeman et al., 2009). 
 
4 The longest single incidence of a behavior in the 16.25 hours of video we coded was 
494 seconds (8 min 14 sec) and involved a manager providing an update on a 
particularly complex project (MEJ) 
 
5 Table 5 presents the odds ratio for every possible dyadic sequence of behavior we 
coded (i.e. the likelihood relative to chance that Behavior 2 (the code in the column 
headings) will follow Behavior 1 (the code in the rows)). The odds ratio is a direct 
measure of effect size for each sequence of behaviors, so is directly interpretable 
(Bakeman and Quera, 2011). 
 
	
